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THE ORIGINS OF AMBIVALENCE IN TRANSNATIONAL NORMS
Frederick 0. Bonkovsky *

I. INTRODUCTION

Modern transnational theory began its emergence in the 17th
century. As is so often the case with human achievement, this
advancement is attributable primarily to the work of one man, the
Dutch lawyer-scholar, Hugo Grotius. Like his predecessors, Grotius
approached interstate politics with a particular concern for the norms
relating to war. Within this context, he developed his ideas of
international relations and law.
Fully convinced... that there is a common law among nations, which is
valid alike for war and in war, I have had many and weighty reasons for
undertaking to write upon this subject. Throughout the Christian world I
observed a lack of restraint in relation to war, such as even barbarous races
should be ashamed of; I observed that men rush to arms for slight causes, or
no cause at all, and that when arms have once been taken up there is no
longer any respect for law, divine or human .... I

Grotius' magnum opus of 1625, De Jure Belli ac Pacis, represented
the culmination and summary of Western international norms through
the 17th century. But Grotius' explicit statement of international

mores in legalized terms marked a departure from medieval thought.
By secularizing natural law and, more importantly, by recognizing the
new international system of the sovereign nation-states, Grotius made
major alterations in transnational theory, thus earning the sobriquet,
"father of international law."
As will be seen, however, a serious ambivalence marked Grotius'
views. His modernity was demonstrated most notably in his recognition that international politics was the province of a number of
sovereign nation-states, each of which defined its own values and
purposes. Although this view diverged considerably from medieval
conceptions, Grotius unfortunately retained many aspects of an earlier
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"just war" theory that vitiated much of his innovative genius. This
article examines these conflicting approaches to international norms
developed by the first modern theorist of interstate relations.

II.THE PROBLEM OF

Jus

AND LEX

Grotius made no attempt to state an international "law" as that
term is used today.2 He set forth norms of international conduct
based on the single standard of transcendent "justice" or "right." In
the age of the rising nation-state and in an international milieu where
states were becoming the recognized actors, Grotius separated the
sphere of norms from the sphere of law and centered his study upon
the former. In fact, Grotius specifically rejected the use of positive law
as a basis for his work. "Let the laws [of the state] be silent, then, in
the midst of arms," 3 he said, and recognized the inapplicability of
parochial domestic standards. Similarly, other elements of human law
had to be disregarded:
the elements of positive law, since they often undergo change and are
different in different places, are outside the domain of systematic
4
treatment, just as other notions of particular things are.
Hence, treaties concluded between states were not a part of his theory of
international norms. As a lawyer and a scholar influenced by medieval
tradition, and in spite of what he understood and sought to do,
Grotius unfortunately articulated his novel theory in legalistic
medieval language, terming his standards the "law of nature" and the
"law of nations."
By the term "law of nations," Grotius meant regularity in national
practices. He held that nations in fact operated according to common
standards of action. This playing by the "rules of the game" may be
termed law in much the same way as one speaks of a "law of gravity."
Certain forces, including ethical behavior and self-interest, produce
regular behavior among states in the sense that gravity produces
2. See Pound, Grotius in the Science of Law, 19 AM. J. INT'L L. 685 (1925).
See generally C.
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(1848). Von Kaltenborn traces the sources and foundations of Grotius'
thought in such writers as the Catholics Vasquez, Suarez and Molina. In addition,
Reformation leaders including Luther, Melancthon and Johannes Olendorp had a
considerable effect on Grotius' political thinking. It was the Catholics, however,
who primarily posited ideas about international law.
3. DE JURE, Prolegomena, para. 26.
4. DE JURE, Prolegomena, para. 30.
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predictable behavior among falling bodies.' International norm was
dependent, therefore, not on the concept of an external lawgiver or
judge, but on the interrelation of the actors. The theory thus allowed
each state to be sovereign. The paradigm was not that of a
transcendent and universal "natural law" nor that of an ethical
structure imposed on the Corpus Christianum by the Roman church;
rather, Grotius' "law of nations" operated in terms of policy decisions
of national actors.
In the dedication, Grotius termed De Jure Belli a book "written on
behalf of justice" and not a treatise on law or war.
In giving to out treatise the title "The Law of War," we mean first of
all... to inquire whether any war can be just, and then, what is just in war.
For law in our use of the term here means nothing else than what is
just.., that being lawful which is not unjust.
Now that is unjust which
is in conflict with the nature of society of
6
beings endowed with reason.
The question of the "law of war" thus involved an inquiry into the
question of what was just in war. Law, in this meaning, was "a rule of
moral actions imposing obligation to what is right.... related to the

matter not only of justice... but also of other virtues." 7
Grotius' shorthand for normative standards in international politics
was "the law of nature." He was concerned with the morality that
prevailed on earth and believed that the rational, concientious and
ethical actor could perceive what justice demanded in a given
circumstance through the use of reason:
The law of nature is a dictate of right reason, which points out that an act,
according as it is or is not in conformity with rational nature, has in it a
quality of moral baseness or moral necessity; and that, in consequence, such
an act is either forbidden or enjoined ....8
In this theory, the rational order of things is unalterable and eternal.
For example, as to the proposition that murder is evil, the "law of
nature . is unchangeable." 9 What constitutes murder, however, is
open to consideration by right reason. "Furthermore, some things
belong to the law of nature not through a simple relation but as a
result of a particular combination of circumstances."'1
It cannot be
5. The analogy to the law of gravity is ours. For Grotius' discussion of the law
of nations see DE JuRE,Prolegomena, para. 17.
6. DE JURE, Book I, Ch.I, § III, para. 1.
7. DE JURE, Book I, Ch.I, § IX, para. 1.

8.
9.
10.

DE JURE, Book I, Ch.I, § X, para. 1.
DE JURE, Book I, Ch.I, § X, para. 5.
DE JURE, Book I, Ch.I, § X, para. 7.
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emphasized too strongly that Grotius allowed for this open-ended
view of natural law.
In addition, he insisted that the law of nature, or the ethics of all
mankind, would be known, valid and applicable even if "there is no
God, or [if] the affairs of men are of no concern to Him." 11 Men can
learn what is right and just from historical example, from customary
practice and from Scriptural precedent. Such knowledge is gained
through informed right reason. Whatever is at variance with the
limitations imposed by human intelligence, a well-tempered judgment
or the powers of discrimination that enable men to decide what things
are agreeable or harmful is "contrary also to the law of nature, that
is, to the nature of man." 12
Conscience and expediency were the two operative touchstones for
this normative system. Taking an associational view of mankind, much
like that of Aristotle, Grotius argued that there is among men "an
impelling desire for society, that is, for the social life... peaceful, and
organized ...."13 This "nature of man" that craves for sociability is
the mother of universal norms. 11 For both individuals and states,
justice brings peace of conscience, while injustice causes torments and
anguish.... Justice is approved, and injustice condemned, by the common
agreement of good men. 15
Expediency undergirds the natural ethic. The law of nature binds
the universal association together. It is precisely by agreeing on norms
that mankind is made one. 6 Moreover, no state within the international community is so strong that it can go it alone. Each needs the
"help of others outside itself, either for the purposes of trade, or even
to ward off the forces of many foreign nations united against it." 11
This second element encourages even the strongest sovereign state to
act in accordance with international norms. "[T] he state which
transgresses the laws of nature and of nations cuts away also the
bulwarks which safeguard its own future peace." 1 Expedience
therefore dictates that alliances and international agreements be based
implicitly on normative standards of honor, right and justice. 19 "No
11. DE JURE, Prolegomena, para. 11.
12. DE JuRE, Prolegomena, para. 9.
13. DE JURE, Prolegomena, para. 6.
14. DE JURE, Prolegomena, para. 16.
15. DE JURE, Prolegomena, para. 20. This is not unlike the modern
sociological assertion that shared values bind together a community.
16. DE JuRE, Prolegomena, para. 23.
17. DE JURE, Prolegomena, para. 22.
18. DE JURE, Prolegomena, para. 18.
19. DE JURE, Prolegomena, para. 22.
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one readily allies himself with those in whom he believes that there is
only a slight regard for law, for the right, and for good faith." 2 0 What
is determinative in international politics, therefore, is the moral
relationship between the actors.

Il.

THE NATURE OF WAR

A. New Presumptions
In taking up the question put by Thomas Aquinas, "whether it is
ever lawful to wage war," Grotius reversed the medieval presumption.
Concerning this basic "principle of nature," he maintained that "all
points are in [war's] favor" because war is aimed at the preservation
of life and things useful to life. 21 Right reason surely does not
prohibit war. History, both Scriptural and secular, proves its validity.2 2
In one splendid paragraph, Grotius dealt with opponents from the left
and the right. The left, pacifists like Erasmus, insisted that war was
immoral. The right, advocates of the secular prince like Machiavelli,
held that raison d'etat was an ethic unto itself. Both are wrong, said
Grotius, for war is essentially an "enforcement of rights." 3
Grotius supported the Calvinist position that the magistrate's duty
before God is to protect the innocent. 2 4 To this end, war was

primarily a procedure for the assertion of justice and right and, as such,
it became a positive moral act. Grotius thus refuted the Christian
tradition of pacifism found in leftist Protestant sects and the apparent
prohibitions of the New Testament.
Grotius wanted only to reverse the medieval presumption, not to
justify holy crusades against "immoral enemies." To the contrary, he
insisted that most wars are fought for doubtful causes. In his view, the
undertaking of war raised a problem of ethics to which rigid legal
standards were inapplicable. Like Aristotle, he held that "certainty is
not found in moral questions in the same degree as in mathematical
science." 25 An absolute standard is rarely applicable since "even
trifling circumstances alter the substance [of the matter] ...
26

20.

DE JURE,

Prolegomena, para. 27.

21. DE JURE, Book I, Ch. II, § I, para. 4.
22. See DE JURE, Book I, Ch. II, § I, para. 5; Book I, Ch. II, § II, para. 2;
Book I, Ch. II, § § III, IV.
23. DE JURE, Prolegomena, para. 25.
24. DE JURE, Book I, Ch. II, § § VIII, IX.
25. DE JURE, Book II, Ch. XXIII, § I.
26. In this part of DeJure, Grotius followed rather closely the categories of
Aristotle'sNichomachean Ethics. DE JURE, Book II, Ch. XXIII.
Vol. 5-No. 2
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While reversing the presumption, Grotius insisted that war should
not be undertaken when the slightest doubt of any kind existed. Here,
as elsewhere, he echoed Augustine, who insisted that war be engaged
in reluctantly, even when the cause was just. "Often a right should be
given up in order to avoid war." 2 7 States should renounce the right of
punishment in particular. At best, "war is not to be undertaken save
from a most weighty cause at a most opportune time." 28 Thus, while
recognizing the Augustinian view that war, not peace, is the usual
situation, Grotius desired that it be otherwise, especially among
Christian princes. 29

B. War and the Nation-State
The idea of a nation as an independent sovereign state, and hence as
a unique and self-sufficient society, was foreign to all medieval
understanding. In that view, the only society was that of Christendom,
a supranational union of which kingdoms were dependent members.
Allegiance to the faith and its standards was the overriding and
universal obligation. It is important to realize that for most of its

history, and surely in the later Middle Ages, Western Christianity had
no visible leader who exercised de facto sovereignty. Hence the unity
and obligation of Christendom were theoretical or ideological, rather
than formal or organizational. The international system was built
upon common values, goals and ideas of legitimacy-that is, upon
accepted international norms and agreement on principle. It was not
an institutionalized unity nor one guaranteed by centralized political
power.
In his description of international society and the nation-state,
Grotius fell between two schools: on the one hand, he recognized the
new nation-states as the appropriate units in international action; but
on the other, he attempted to hold to a concept of a unified
international society. In his view of the nation, Grotius reversed the
medieval concepts. In his theories of international society, he clung to
tradition.
It was Grotius who theorized and legitimized the new national state
arrangement and thereby destroyed the assumed unity of
medieval society. At the same time, however, he tried to preserve
some kind of universal international society. He legitimized national
sovereignty in part by giving to the princes the sole authority to wage
27. DE
28. DE

29.

JURE,
JURE,

DE JURE,

Book II, Ch. XXIV, § IX.
Book II, Ch. XXIV, § IX.

Book III, Ch. XXV.
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war. For a war to be a justified public contest, it had to be waged on
both sides "under the authority of the one who holds the sovereign

power in the state." 30 Hence, war was the ultima ratio regnum.
Grotius' jus ad bellum and jus in bello strictures were intended to
govern only the military operations between sovereign princes. These
heads of state alone possessed the jus belli ac pacis. 1
Almost no check on sovereign authority was posited. An immoral
command could be opposed by passive resistance only; rebellion was
not allowable in such circumstances. 3 2 The people could turn against
their sovereign only in the Hobbist circumstance when the king
"openly shows himself the enemy of the whole people." 33
Where international politics was concerned, Grotius insisted that
nations be viewed as integrals. In a kind of consent theory that
foreshadowed Locke, subjects and princes were held responsible for
each other's actions. A nation, though a large number of people, had
a "single essential character" or a "'single spirit."" Thus, it was appropriate that all men be comprehended under the single name and
central authority of a nation-state.
The primary product of the national character or spirit was
sovereign power, which played a central role in holding the state
together. 1s The bond itself could be in accord with justice or
injustice. In this regard, Grotius disagreed with Cicero concerning the
necessity for justice to constitute a state. 36
Grotius insisted that a distinction should be made between the
private and public acts of the sovereign. For his public acts, the entire
state is responsible. "For whatever the king does in acts belonging to
his kingly office should be considered in the same way as if the state
did them." 3 7 Hence, guilt for an unjust act (particularly in regard to
warfare) "passes to rulers from subjects, whether these are subjects of
long standing or recent. Conversely, guilt will pass from the highest
authority to those subject to it .... -3' However, there was no moral
30. DE JURE, Book I, Ch. III, § IV, para. 1.
31. See L. KOTZSCH, THE CONCEPT OF

WAR IN CONTEMPORARY

(1956).
32. Grotius clearly followed the Calvinist tradition in its conservative form.
DE JURE, Book I, Ch. IV, § I, para. 3.
33. DE JURE, Book I, Ch. IV, § XI.
34. DE JURE, Book H, Ch. IX, § III, para. 1.
35. Id.
36. Id. Cicero's position is discussed more fully in his De re Publica and De
Officiis.
37. DE JURE, Book II, Ch. XIV, § I, para. 2.
38. DE JURE, Book II, Ch. XXI, § VII, para. 1.
HISTORY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 38
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culpability involved in opposing the national action. Either active or
tacit consent was necessary for responsibility to apply. "
All of this was of great importance, for it reversed the major
medieval doctrine of non-combatant immunity in war. The medieval
picture of war, which is recreated by many contempory theorists, was
that of a prince making war with a few advisors and a mercenary
force. Most of the population was not involved; hence it was immune
from the violence. For Grotius the picture was quite different. The
citizenry was normally as responsible for national action as was the
sovereign. Hence, it would be appropriate that the entire state be
endangered by war. This laid the basis for a theory of total warfare.
The modern Western fact and theory of the nation-state in international affairs is quite in accord with the scenario described by Grotius.
C. War and the InternationalMilieu
Grotius had a voluntarist view of international society which held
that its standards were established by man and not by some higher
force. The actors in international society, asserted Grotius, are
nation-states and particularly their sovereigns. In the same way that
bishops were "in some way ...

'entrusted with the care of the

Universal Church,' so kings, in addition to the particular care of their
own state, are also burdened with responsibility for human society."

40

National actors were charged with the care of international life.
Grotius compared the international sphere to an unorganized region.
He recognized that statutoty law was absent. But the "general law of
mankind," the law that reigns on earth, applies. Even in wartime, a
good faith requirement controlled the belligerent conduct of
enemies. 41

It would be especially useful for international society to have a
common morality, said Grotius. Were there such agreement, war
would be necessary only when it was clearly violated. This, in fact,
was Grotius' view of what international society ought to be and, to
some degree, was. He envisioned a nonrevolutionary international
system in which actors agreed upon the ethic or general law that
constituted the human community. In this context, war was the
assertion of a right against an unjustice.

39. DE JURE, Book II, Ch. XXI, § § XVII, XVIII.
40. DE JURE, Book II, Ch. XX, § XLIV, para. 1.
41. DE JURE, Book III, Ch.XIX discusses "good faith."
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Although the period in which Grotius wrote was fraught with
international violence, he continued to insist that war served to regain,
establish or defend justice. When he escaped to France in 1621, civil
wars raged-grandees against the Crown, Catholics against Huguenots.
Grotius' home country, the United Provinces, was asking for French
aid in its conflict with Spain. Foreign armies ravaged Germany. In the
background, the conflict between the Islamic Turks and the West
brewed and simmered. Hence conflict, international and civil, was
common. Nevertheless, Grotius insisted that men and nations knew a
common standard, the law of mankind, and that just wars could be
waged only under that banner.
So it was that the sovereignty and dominance Grotius granted the
nation-state with the one hand, he took away with the other.
Realistically, he admitted the rise and power of sovereign princes. He
granted that wars were waged between them and their kingdoms. But
Grotius was unwilling to take the idea of a world of nation-states to its
pluralist conclusion. Instead, he desired the voluntary maintenance of
a medieval international society with its stated rules and shared values.
In that context war could be a juridical process. But, as he realized,
that world had already passed, if indeed it ever had existed.

IV. GROTIUS'

CONTRADICTORY

VIEWS OF JUSTIFIED WAR

The fundamental incongruity in Grotius' international theory was
demonstrated most clearly in his attempt to legalize international
norms. In the process of stating "laws of war," Grotius weakened both
strands of his thought. He bastardized medieval morality and at the
same time contradicted his brilliant insights of an international milieu
comprised of sovereign states. Theories of international law and
transnational norms have continued to suffer from this unresolved
discord.

A. "Realist" Guidelines
As a theorist of the new international politics, Grotius recognized
that nations will judge their own causes and set their own rules.
International circumstances are variable and conflict common. Thus
the theorist is unable either to describe universally binding international treaty or organization or to set rules for warfare. Grotius
instead repeatedly and fervently appealed to the state for proper
policy. He urged it to yield minor rights, forget punishment in some
Vol. 5-No. 2
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cases and query others for advice. 42 Since no one could tell nations
how they were to act, states had to be careful in their own
decision-making to insure that war was waged for valid reasons and in
accord with rational policy. 43
The modernizing Grotius was aware that medieval rules did not
apply in the new situation. The doctrine that "innocents must always
be spared" was rejected as based on an antiquated view of warfare. In
the nation state, all citizens are responsible for warfare. Grotius held
princes and subjects alike "guilty" and hence susceptible to punishment.
The right of killing enemies in a public war and other violence against the
person extends not only to these who actually bear arms, or are subjects to
him that stirs up the war, but in addition to all persons who are in the
enemy's territory. 4
Under this view of warfare, all who are members of the enemy state
may be "lawfully injured in any place whatsoever.... For when war is
declared upon any one it is at the same time declared upon the men of
his people ....,,4 In presenting this "modem" view of total warfare,
Grotius specifically noted that the reversal of the medieval tradition

was based on a new understanding of sovereignty and hence of
international politics. Only where a different political situation
applied, as in a neutral country, were different norms applicable. 46
The standards derived from the law of both nature and nations were
quite lax, permitting even the killing of women and children. 47 The
restrictions of jus in bello which Grotius maintained, such as the
prohibition of poison and rape, were those necessary for future peacemaking. National policy, detailed on the level of jus ad bellum, was
determinative. To insure that the question of policy was uppermost,
the "military," charged with the day-by-day practice of war and
concerning themselves with jus in bello, were excluded from fundamental policy-making. "Generals do not have the power to make
peace.... [T] he terminating of war is, in fact, not a part of the
waging of it." 41

42. DE JURE, Book II, Chs. XX, XXIV.
43. See, e.g., DE JURE, Book II, Ch.I.
44. DE JURE, Book II, Ch.IV, § VI.
45. DE JURE, Book III, Ch.IV, § VIII, para. 1.
46. DE JURE, Book III, Ch.IV, § VIII, para. 3.
47. See Chapters IV and IX of Book III. See also the extensive treatment in
the first four Chapters of Book III.
48. DE JURE, Book III, Ch.XXII, § VII.
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Fully four centuries before its American espousal, the Dutch
scholar pre-shadowed the contours of contemporary norms of warfare.

When the sovereign state proclaims a just war (fus ad bellum),
everything is lawful which is necessary to attain the war's end. When
the cause is just "we must strive with all our strength to win." 4 9 Such
is the first guideline. Other norms that would be practiced by
twentieth-century belligerents included that "he who wages a lawful
war has a right over the captured subjects of the enemy .... so
Similarly, enemy property may be acquired in a lawful war in
keeping with the justice of the cause. s
It is the sovereign prince who determines his own cause. Thus the
fundamental rule is: "In war things which are necessary to attain the
end in view are permissible.... [W] e are understood to have a right
to those things which are necessary for the purpose of securing a
right.. .. ,s2 The national definition of necessity is determinative; jus
ad bellum regulates jus in bello.

Having followed his own logic so impeccably and stated his
conclusions so unambiguously, Grotius retreated. His ideas were too
bold and revolutionary. They would have resulted in an overthrow of
the entire medieval just war doctrine. The new international situation
and the implications of the modem nation-state system were not yet
so overwhelmingly clear. Grotius returned, therefore, to the security
of medieval formulations. Unfortunately, most normative theory since
has followed this lead in refusing to take account of hard
international realities.
As if suddenly aware of where his logic was taking him, Grotius
made a dramatic reversal in Book III, Chapter 10: "I must retrace my
steps, and must deprive those who wage war of nearly all the privileges
which I seemed to grant ...."53 On "higher" grounds, those of

honor, he returned the discussion to more traditional channels.
B. The JuridicalView

Instead of positing an international system comprised of separate
and sovereign nations, other legalistic and domestic categories were
employed. The two broad "causes" justifying war were defense and
49. DE

JURE,

Book III, Ch. XX, § XLIII, para. 3. See R.

TUCKER, THE

(1960) (very similar statement of the modern American view).
50. DE JURE, Book III, Ch.XIV, § I, para. 1.
51. DE JURE, Book III, Ch.XIII.

JUST WAR

52.
53.

DE JURE, Book III, Ch. I, § II.
DE JURE, Book III, Oh. X, § I.
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punishment. "1 A nation was presumed to possess certain rights which
it could justifiably defend or seek to regain. Thus arose Grotius'
traditional definition of war: "the right to use force in obtaining one's
own." s1 In spite of the conflicts around him, Grotius assumed a stable
international system in which national "rights" were existent and
universally recognized.
The political actor who violated rights was characterized as
criminal, reprobate or at least misguided. Any war, even offensive and
pre-emptive, was appropriate as long as fought to regain rights. War
was an instrument of reparation. 56
Grotius' juristic view of international politics was manifest in the
legalistic and domestic parallels he employed.
[W]ar is directed against those who cannot be held in check by judicial
processes.... [I] n order that wars be justified, they must be carried
on
5
with not less scrupulousness than judicial processes are wont to be. 7
Various torts and crimes that states commit against one another were
enumerated. In spite of his view of sovereignty, Grotius seems never to
have considered the fact that under his definition sovereign states
could commit no crimes in legal terms if they were in fact sovereign
and did not consider their actions wrong. In other words, Grotius
either overlooked or avoided what Hobbes would later specify as the
meaning of sovereignty.
The second major just cause for war was punishment of evildoers. 58 The idea of war as punishment and the right to wage a
punitive war are regularly termed the culmination of Grotius' thought.
It had been a central concern in his De Jure Praedaeof 1604 and was
clearly restated in 1625. Following Augustine, just wars were defined
as those which avenge injuries. Plato had sanctioned warlike measures
until the guilty had been compelled to pay the penalty. An absolute
declaration of war was therefore legitimately made, in Grotius' view,
when one party has "committed crimes that call for punishment." 9

This schema ascribed absolute legitimacy to the status quo. That
which disturbed was a priori wrong. The task of warfare was to restore
the status quo ante when judicial settlement fails.
54. The title of Book II, Ch. I, § II is: "Justifiable causes include defence, the
obtaining of that which belongs to us or is our due, and the inflicting of
punishment."

55.
56.
57.
58.

59.

DE
DE
DE
DE
DE

JURE,
JURE,
JURE,

Book I, Ch. I, § X, para. 7.
Book II passim.
Book II, Ch. XVII, § I; Book II, Chs. XX, XXI passim.

JURE, Book II, Ch. I, § II, para. 2.
JURE,

Book III, Ch. III, § VI, para. 1.
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Not only the international and domestic levels of politics but also
the national and the personal were confused. When a state engages in
unjust war, Grotius said, the ruler and subjects are guilty of crime. 60
The issue is distinctly personal. "Guilt, however, attaches to the
individuals who have agreed to the crime ... ."'1
By the same standard, individuals may remove themselves from the

state and its action by dissenting from national policy. 62 The final
example of Grotius' viewing war as akin to domestic legal processes despite apparent recognition of the new nationalism was his equating
killing in wars and capital punishment. In a regularly repeated theme
Grotius insisted that both have the same genesis:
Now it is in the love of innocent men that both capital punishment and
just wars have their origin.... [Both the Old Testament and the teachings
of Christ attest to this fact.] Familiar
is the old saying: "It is as much a
63
cruelty to spare all as to spare none."
Similarly, repeated parallels were drawn between norms of conduct
for individuals and for states. Nations were referred to as thieves,
robbers and pirates. 64
Grotius' failure to distinguish levels of political activity was not
simply a fault in illustration or an occasional lapse. Although in many
instances he did recognize international politics as sui generis,
ultimately he continued the medieval practice of equating the personal
and the national, the domestic and the international. So he could
state, ". .. just as this principle [of love] applies to individuals, so
also it is applicable to peoples as such, and to kings as such." 65
States were judged to have the same kind of moral qualities as
persons. They were expected to adhere to mores similar to those of
domestic actors. It was taken as a principle of international politics
that only those free from like offenses may exact punishment and that
the guilty party could not be punished by another equally guilty. 66

60. DE

JURE,

Book II, Ch. XXI, § VII.

61. DE JURE, Book II, Ch. XXI, § VII, para. 2.
62. DE JURE, Book II, Ch. XXI, § § XVII-XIX. Grotius thus assumed a rigid
consent theory which did not take account of the more usual forms of tacit
consent and lack of participation common in actual democratic nation-states,
much less in other political arrangements. It seems that Grotius felt that subjects
in less than consensual systems simply are not responsible for national action. This
dramatic consent theory is a point almost entirely overlooked in the literature on
Grotius.
63. DE JURE, Book I, Ch. II, § VIII, para. 10.
64. DE JURE, Book II, Ch. I, § I, para. 3.
65. DE JURE, Book II, Ch. XX, § III.
66. DE JURE, Book II, Ch. XX, § VII, para. 1.
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The basis of international moralism was grounded in the idea that only
those who are "not subject to vices of the same kind or of equal
seriousness" are legitimate actors. 67 Thus, the theoretical basis was
laid for the necessity of seeing war in absolutist terms-a conflict
between the forces of light and those of darkness.
Grotius specifically rejected any other right to wage war. His
attempts to recognize the new nation-state and the international
situation as it actually was did not prevail. International norms were
equated to personal norms by the use of faulty paradigms. War was
legitimated as a defense of an imagined stable and constant status quo

that was implicitly assumed to be just.
V. CONCLUSION

In the first part of the De Jure Belli, Grotius came very close to
espousing a revolutionary doctrine. In the second half, he relapsed
into a statement of rules and legal codes that largely repeated medieval
strictures. Little recognition was given to the changing milieu. Grotius
thereby trapped himself, and succeeding theorists who copied him,
into theorizing international norms in terms of rigid and formalistic
prescriptions.
The later Grotius viewed war in terms of killing. He repeated
medieval prohibitions on involving noncombatants.
It is bidding of mercy, if not of justice, that, except for reasons which are
weighty and will affect the safety of many, no action should be attempted
whereby innocent persons may be threatened with destruction. 68
Grotius previously had treated primarily the "weighty" facts of
politics and the larger societies of men and their safety. Now he called
for mercy and disregarded justice, the political virtue. Thus he became
involved in the convoluted vagaries of intention and double effect. 69
The implications of an international milieu comprised of sovereign
nation-states were forgotten. Before his retreat, Grotius was coming
to terms with the impact of multi national sovereignty on standards of
transnational action. But by restating medieval concepts and returning
to that framework, Grotius allowed succeeding theorists to avoid the

dilemmas that he had made plain in the first half of his work.

67. Id.
68. DE JURE, Book III, Ch. XI, § VIII.
69. The attempt at rule specification and extended considerations of specific
cases are discussed throughout Book III, especially at Chapter XI, § II, Chapter
VIII and Chapter XI.
Spring, 1972

AMBIVALENCE IN TRANSNA TIONAL NORMS

The result has been that for over four centuries international
normative theory has been unable to take account of the radical
implications of national sovereignty. Tenets of international
community have been yoked unequally with those informed by
solipcist national sovereignty. Formal morality has been pulled in the
former direction; practice has been guided in terms of the latter. In
general, normative theory has remained unable to comprehend the
ramifications of national sovereignty in transnational politics.
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